

Revista


Estudios en Seguridad y Defensa

Volume 20, Issue 39, January-June 2025

Bogotá, D.C, Colombia

ISSN: 1900-8325 • eISSN: 2744-8932

Página web: <https://esdegrevistas.edu.co/index.php/resd>



What were the effects of the Falklands/Malvinas War on Anglo-Brazilian diplomatic and defence relations between 1982-1985?

¿Cuáles fueron los efectos de la Guerra de las Malvinas/Falklands en las relaciones diplomáticas y de defensa anglo-brasileñas entre 1982 y 1985?

Maísa Edwards 

King's College London, London, United Kingdom

APA CITATION:

Edwards, M. (2025). What were the effects of the Falklands/Malvinas War on Anglo-Brazilian diplomatic and defence relations between 1982-1985? *Estudios en Seguridad y Defensa*, 20(39), 117-135.

<https://doi.org/10.25062/1900-8325.4977>



Published online: **June 30, 2025**



[Submit an article to the Journal](#)



OPEN  ACCESS

The articles published by the *Revista Estudios en Seguridad y Defensa* are Open Access under a Creative Commons: [Attribution - Non Commercial - No Derivatives](#).

What were the effects of the Falklands/Malvinas War on Anglo-Brazilian diplomatic and defence relations between 1982-1985?

¿Cuáles fueron los efectos de la Guerra de las Malvinas/Falklands en las relaciones diplomáticas y de defensa anglo-brasileñas entre 1982 y 1985?

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25062/1900-8325.4977>

Maísa Edwards 

King's College London, London, United Kingdom

Abstract

The Falklands/Malvinas War (FMW), the most recent conflict in the South Atlantic, is predominately studied in relation to its combatant nations. However, as this article demonstrates, the FMW (April-June 1982) had significant repercussions for Anglo-Brazilian diplomatic and defence relations. At the time, Argentina was governed by a military junta (1976-1983), which led the country into war, resulting in a decisive defeat and the eventual collapse of the regime. In contrast, the United Kingdom's victory strengthened the Conservative government under Thatcher, reversing its declining political fortunes. The FMW also affected Brazil's foreign and defence policies. Under military dictatorship since 1964, Brazil had recently improved relations with Argentina following President Figueiredo's 1980 visit to Buenos Aires. While Brazil's historical ties with the UK were positive, its 20th-century foreign policy was primarily focused on fostering closer ties with the United States. This article therefore examines the effects of the FMW on Anglo-Brazilian diplomatic and defence relations between April 1982 and March 1985, the final year of Brazil's military dictatorship, with a supplementary focus on its arms trade.

Key words: Anglo-Brazilian relations; Falklands/Malvinas War; geopolitics; international relations; South Atlantic

La Guerra de las Malvinas/Falklands (FMW), el conflicto más reciente en el Atlántico Sur, se estudia predominantemente en relación con sus naciones combatientes. Sin embargo, como demuestra este artículo, la FMW (abril-junio de 1982) tuvo importantes repercusiones en las relaciones diplomáticas y de defensa anglo-brasileñas. En aquella época, Argentina estaba gobernada por una junta militar (1976-1983), que llevó al país a la guerra, con el resultado de una derrota decisiva y el eventual colapso del régimen. Por el contrario, la victoria del Reino Unido fortaleció al gobierno conservador de Thatcher, invirtiendo su declinante fortuna política. La guerra fría también afectó a la política exterior y de defensa de Brasil. Sometido a una dictadura militar desde 1964, Brasil había mejorado recientemente sus relaciones con Argentina tras la visita del presidente Figueiredo a Buenos Aires en 1980. Aunque los lazos históricos de Brasil con el Reino Unido fueron positivos, su política exterior del siglo XX se centró principalmente en fomentar lazos más estrechos con Estados Unidos. Por lo tanto, este artículo examina los efectos de la FMW en las relaciones diplomáticas y de defensa anglo-brasileñas entre abril de 1982 y marzo de 1985, el último año de la dictadura militar de Brasil, centrándose además en su comercio de armas.

Palabras Clave: Atlántico Sur; Geopolítica; Guerra de las Malvinas/Falklands; Relaciones anglo-brasileñas; Relaciones Internacionales.

Resumen



Scientific Research Article

Received: April 24, 2025 • Accepted: May 15, 2025

Contact: Maísa Edwards  maisa.edwards@kcl.ac.uk

Introduction

The Falkland Islands, also known as the Islas Malvinas, are an archipelago in the South West Atlantic Ocean. The Islands are a British Overseas Territory, located approximately 400 miles from the South American mainland. Although officially British, the Islands' sovereignty has long been challenged by the Argentines, who consider the Islands to be a part of their national territory. This dispute escalated in the 1980s, under the rule of Argentina's then military government (1976-1983), leading to an Argentine invasion of the Islands on the 2nd April 1982. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and her Cabinet, in response, assembled a Task Force to reclaim the Islands. These actions led to the Falklands/Malvinas War (FMW), a military conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentina, lasting from 2nd April 1982 until 14th June 1982. The number of casualties has been described as "severe - 800 to 1,000 Argentine and 250 British dead - but still only a small proportion of the forces committed" (Freedman, 1982, p.196). Although brief, this conflict had an important impact on the UK and Thatcher's Conservative Government (1979-1990), in addition to contributing to the fall of the Argentine military junta. Moreover, it is argued that "the Falklands War can be seen as a watershed in post-war British political life" (Freedman, 1988, p. 4).

The FMW is similarly regarded as "the conflict that synthesised in a complex manner many of the problems that have characterised international relations in Latin America and their internal dimensions"¹ (Muñoz, 1982, p. 499). This short conflict has also been demonstrated by authors as prompting a significant shift in geopolitical attitudes towards the South Atlantic region (Arquilla & Rasmussen, 2001; Hurrell, 1983). Brazil, Argentina's largest neighbour, was also under military rule at the time and had historically maintained a strong and friendly relationship with the UK.² The purpose of this article is to explore the effects of the FMW on Anglo-Brazilian diplomatic relations and defence relations, including on its arms trade, in the years 1982-1985. Combining original research and a review of pertinent academic literature, I have sought to provide an analysis of this three-year period, by analysing the diplomatic and defence policies pursued by the UK, under Thatcher's Government, and by Brazil's military regime. This research also examines sources from the United Nations Digital Library, the Falklands War Photographic Dossiers (FKD Collections) in the Imperial War Museum (IWM) Archives in London, and from the British and Brazilian press. This article is divided into two sections, focusing on

1 "el conflicto que sintetizó de un modo complejo muchos de los problemas que han caracterizado las relaciones internacionales de América Latina y sus dimensiones internas".

2 Anglo-Brazilian diplomatic and defence relations date back to the period when Brazil was still a Portuguese colony. The Royal Navy was an integral part of the fleet which safely escorted and transported the Portuguese Royal family from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro in 1808, during the Napoleonic War. During Brazil's pursuit to gain independence, Lord Cochrane, formerly with the Royal Navy, assisted Brazil's fledgling Navy in its naval campaigns against the Portuguese Navy.

two main periods: Anglo-Brazilian diplomatic and defence relations during the FMW (April – June 1982) and during the final years of the Brazilian military dictatorship (1982-1985).

Falklands/Malvinas War (1982) – What role did Brazil play during the conflict?

The FMW was a war of short duration, fought between 2nd April – 14th June 1982. This is a war which altered the recent history of the South Atlantic region and brought to a head a disputed sovereignty claims existing since the 1840s. Argentina claims it inherited the Islands from Spain, once it gained its independence, yet the “islands were formally established as a [British] crown colony in 1840” (Freedman, 1988, p. 19). The UK has thus officially administered the Islands since the 1840s. The FMW was one of the last international conflicts during the Cold War (1947-1990) and led the UK to assemble its largest fighting force since the Suez Crisis (1956). Although brief, the War had significant impacts in both the UK and Argentina and, in turn, led to an altering of relations between Argentina and its Southern Cone neighbours. This section will analyse the FMW, and the actions taken by the British and Argentine governments. The significance of Brazil, and whether it played a role in the conflict, albeit not a direct one with boots on the ground, will also be examined.

A sign of the strength of Brazil's relations with Argentina can be seen in the direct aftermath of the War, as Brazil continues to support Argentina's claim to the Falklands/Malvinas Islands. It is also significant to note that whilst diplomatic relations were suspended between the UK and Argentina for eight years following the FMW, the Brazilian Embassy in London played host to an Argentine delegation³ from 1982-1990, acting as an intermediary between the two former combatant countries. At the same time, it can be argued that by acting in this way, Brazil was demonstrating some tacit support for Argentine diplomatic positions. In other words, it took an active decision to facilitate this diplomatic channel for Argentina.

Although the country has claimed sovereignty of the Falklands/Malvinas Islands since the early 19th century, Argentina's desire to actively reclaim the Islands has been often linked to the nationalist agendas of those in power. The continuing extent to which the “Malvinas” are still viewed as central to Argentine national rhetoric is also critical to bear in mind, as it remains a cause for both the political Right and Left. It is thus important to remember that Argentina was governed, at the time of the FMW, by a military junta (1976-1983). This government's nationalist campaign to restore Argentine honour, as it claimed, was however reinforced by growing assumptions that the UK was no longer

3 Similarly, the UK had maintained a diplomatic presence in Buenos Aires, its Embassy building remaining open as the British Interests Section of the Swiss Embassy.

interested in the fate of the Islands and its dependencies. A clear indicator of this British disinterest was the withdrawal of *HMS Endurance* in June 1981; "this ship, although sparsely armed, constituted the sole regular British naval presence in the South Atlantic and had taken on a symbolic importance far beyond its military capabilities" (Freedman, 1988, p. 31). Another indicator of this disinterest was the British Nationality Act 1981.

This Act altered the parameters of what made a person British and reclassified the citizenship of those who lived in British Overseas Territories, including the Falkland Islands. The British Nationality Act "failed to make special provision for the islanders [...] [as it] limited citizenship rights in British dependencies; thus, many suffered a loss of 'Britishness'" (Freedman, 1988, p. 32). The departure of *HMS Endurance* was interpreted by Argentina as a further retreat in the UK's commitment to the Falklands/Malvinas Islands as it left them unprotected militarily, other than by a small garrison of Royal Marines near the Islands' capital Stanley and lessened the Islanders' protection as British nationals. These actions may have sustained views, held by Argentina as well as other countries, that had been mounting since the debacle in Suez in 1956. These views were centred on how the UK's retreat from Egypt was proof of its decline, both as a world power and a leader with significant military capabilities.

The FMW was precipitated by the Argentine attack on South Georgia, part of the South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, and a dependency of the Falklands. This occurred when Argentine marines landed at the port of Leith on the 25th March 1982. The Argentines failed to register with the British authorities at Grytviken and, instead, "on setting foot on South Georgia, raised the Argentine flag" (Burns, 2002, p.152). The Falkland/Malvinas Islands were invaded, a week later, on the 2nd April 1982 after a brief skirmish with the Islands' Royal Marines. Argentine troops proceeded to declare, in their eyes, their rightful sovereignty over the Islands. This declaration was not well received by the UK, nor in part by many members of the United Nations. UN Resolution 502 was adopted and issued by the UN Security Council on the 3rd April 1982 and clearly demanded "an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas)" (UN Security Council, 1982).

Argentina refused to comply, and this action led to Thatcher's Cabinet authorising a British Task Force, with sailors, soldiers and airmen from the Royal Navy, British Army and Royal Air Force to retake the Islands. The "invasion of the Falklands would not only test the "Iron Lady's" mettle but would represent a key test of Britain's sense of self in the 1980s" (McCourt, 2014, p. 138). The news of Argentina's actions rallied the British public and diverted their attention from the perceived failings and the existing unpopularity of the Prime Minister and her Government. The knowledge that "behind the Argentine military expedition to recover the Malvinas lay a military junta" (Boyce, 2005, p. 1) also served to amplify the sense of justice of a long-established democracy going to war to take on a

military junta. As the Islands were officially a British Overseas Territory and Argentina had forcibly taken them, this compounded a feeling of 'defending one's own'. This would also have been perceived as a significant slight to the image and prestige of the UK itself. The UK "on more solid legal grounds, cited the self-defence provision of Article 51 of the UN Charter" (Little, 1988, p. 138).

The Falkland/Malvinas Islands are situated approximately 400 miles from the South American mainland and are therefore more easily accessible to Argentina than to the UK. For this reason, the decisions made about how to liberate the Islands had to be carefully thought out by Thatcher's Government. The British campaign also needed to be of short duration as "if Britain failed to get quick results, then its military operation would become difficult to sustain and it would be forced to retreat" (Freedman, 1988, p. 45). President Galtieri and his military junta in Argentina, however, saw their taking of the Islands as an important opportunity to win public support and possibly steer international gaze away from allegations of human rights abuses⁴ and from the country's struggling economy. It is also likely that the junta saw "action in the Malvinas as a low-risk option, given that a huge British response seemed hard to fathom"⁵ (Muñoz, 1982, p. 510). The invasion of the Islands initially proved to be effective as "the action [in Argentina] caught almost everyone by surprise and sparked broad public support" (Romero, 2013, p.243). However, it was a conflict in which a "Third World country with largely dated military equipment, a conscript army, and virtually no power-projection capability took on a technologically sophisticated, nuclear-armed great power with a modern blue-water fleet and an experienced professional army" (Welch, 1997, p. 483). This would have repercussions during the FMW, even though, "the Argentine Air Force could count on two Embraer P-95s leased from Brazil for maritime surveillance missions, alternating with the P-2, due to their short range", which meant that "the Argentines used the C-130 Hercules and a military Boeing 707 to identify British ships on the route from Ascension Island until the theater of operations" (Duarte and Machado, 2021, p. 60).

While it is accurate to state that the UK had more sophisticated Armed Forces, it is nevertheless important to note that under Thatcher's government (1979-1990), the British Armed Forces and particularly the Royal Navy had been subject to intense reviews and cuts in spending. Indeed, the vessel that was later to be a key player during the FMW, *HMS Invincible*, was on the verge of being sold to the Royal Australian Navy. It has also been argued that "the outbreak of the war may have been occasioned in part by the decision of the Ministry of Defence to withdraw its naval presence in the South

4 Brazil, a fellow member of Operation Condor, was also guilty of various human rights abuses during its military regime.

5 "la acción en las Malvinas como una opción de bajo riesgo, ya que una masiva respuesta británica parecía difícil de concretar".

Atlantic as an economy measure in order to help sustain the primary commitments to Nato" (Byrd, 1988, p. 4).

The Falkland/Malvinas Islands were retaken by the British Task Force, which was assembled in a matter of a days, "not only warships were fitted out and equipped but also civilian ships were transformed to take helicopters and to refuel at sea" (Freedman, 1982, p. 201). The 8,000 miles traversed were some of the longest voyages that the British Armed Forces had undertaken to protect British interests in the latter years of the Cold War. Diplomatic relations were cut off with Argentina and Argentine financial assets frozen as the UK prepared itself for war. The convoy of British ships, including the aircraft carriers *HMS Hermes*, the British flagship, and *HMS Invincible*, frigates such as *HMS Antelope* and nuclear-powered submarines such as *HMS Conqueror*, set sail from the UK to retake the Islands. The ships carried Chinook, Westland Wessex and Sea King helicopters as well as Harrier and Sea Harrier jump jet fighters, all capable of launching attacks and protecting the Task Force. Weaponry included surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface missiles and other artillery and torpedoes. The SS *Canberra* and later the *Queen Elizabeth 2* ocean liners, nominally used as cruise ships, were requisitioned and used as troop ships, carrying thousands of men to the South Atlantic.

The Task Force reached the South Atlantic on the 15th April 1982, with the British vanguard stopping at the British Overseas Territory of Ascension Island the following day. Ascension Island was to prove to be a significant strategic base during the War, as British ships and support vessels docked there on their way to the South Atlantic. The Task Force began its military campaign upon reaching the island of South Georgia on the 21st April 1982. South Georgia was re-taken by the British in four days, with the Argentines at Grytviken surrendering on the 25th April 1982. The British assault on the Falkland/Malvinas Islands required more time, and victory was not as swift. Before reaching the Islands, the British Government declared a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) of 200 nautical miles around the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. This extended to all non-British aircraft and ships. Any sea vessel or aircraft seen entering the TEZ or perceived as a threat would have incurred a serious risk of being fired upon.

The actions of the Argentine junta regarding the Falkland/Malvinas Islands presented Brazil with an awkward dilemma. Although a long-term ally of the UK, the Brazilian military government was not prepared to undo the relations that had been carefully built with the Argentines during their period of rapprochement in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The modern age of arms, energy and new technology had brought the two giants of the Southern Cone to positions of rivalry and mutual suspicion. Indeed, it has been argued that "mutual wariness between the two countries has traditionally been strongest in the military establishments" (Selcher, 1985, p. 44). However, since the resolution of differences over the Itaipú hydroelectric dam in October 1979, with the signing of the Tripartite

Agreement, Brazil and Argentina were, in a sense, closer than they had been since their unlikely alliance in the Paraguayan War (1864-1870). The success of the rapprochement between Brazil's President Figueiredo and Argentina's President Videla in 1980, and their meeting in Buenos Aires, also likely contributed to and reinforced Brazil's decision to side with Argentina during the FMW. Brazil supported, and continues to support, Argentina's claim to the Falkland/Malvinas Islands and whenever the issue arises it acts politically and diplomatically in Argentina's favour.

Condemnation of Argentina's actions by the UN Security Council on the 3rd April 1982 was therefore not shared by Brazil nor by other Latin American countries which "were unanimous in their argument, laying the blame for the crisis at Britain's door [...] and of maintaining a colonial relic in the South Atlantic" (Burns, 2002, p. 189). The headline of the well-regarded Brazilian newspaper, the *Folha de S. Paulo*, on the 30th April 1982 was "War arrives today in the Malvinas"⁶ (*Folha de S. Paulo*, 1982), bringing the Brazilian public an awareness of the conflict. The TEZ came into effect that day and President Reagan, after initially trying to maintain a neutral position for the US, declared American support for the British cause. Brazil, however, chose to be militarily neutral in the conflict but not neutral in terms of diplomacy. The latter decision regarding "Brazil's position, both during the conflict and afterwards, was well-received by the Argentines despite Brazil's lack of official fervor and its desire to safeguard relations with Great Britain" (Selcher, 1985, p. 30). Brazil did not intervene directly in the War militarily, but diplomatically it chose not to endorse UN Resolution 502.

However, an incident that merits consideration involves a British Vulcan bomber, flying as part of Operation "Black Buck",⁷ which was impounded in Brazil during the FMW. It is reported to have landed with fuel emergency and was impounded on arrival and held for seven days in Rio de Janeiro at Galeão Air Force Base. In Brazilian press coverage of the event, it was reported on the 4th June 1982 that "FAB [Brazilian Air Force] jet fighters intercept English Vulcan"⁸ (*Folha de S. Paulo*, 1982). The number of personnel on the Vulcan was also unclear, the article citing a crew of six, according to the Brazilian authorities, and a crew of five, according to the British (*Folha de S. Paulo*, 1982). An article in a British newspaper, the *Sunday Express*, on the 22nd November 2015⁹ reported on the incident saying that "Foreign Office telegrams from 1982 now released show the prime

6 "A guerra chega hoje às Malvinas".

7 Operation "Black Buck" was a series of long range attack missions to destroy Argentine air and air defence assets on the Falkland Islands. Vulcans in the mission relied on aerial refuelling. (Raf.mod.uk, 2007).

8 "Caças da FAB [Força Aérea Brasileira] interceptam Vulcan inglês".

9 Twenty-five years after Prime Minister Thatcher's resignation in November 1990.

minister called on the US to intervene after Brazil refused to allow [...] [the Vulcan bomber] to take off under pressure from Argentina" (Sunday Express, 2015).¹⁰

The single largest loss of life during the FMW occurred on the 2nd May 1982 with the sinking of the Argentine Navy's sole cruiser, the *General Belgrano*. Torpedoes fired by the nuclear submarine *Conqueror* severely damaged the cruiser causing its crew to abandon ship. Consequently, "the loss of 321 Argentine lives was therefore a notable turning point in the conflict, when the horror of modern warfare was made plain" (McCourt, 2014, p.155). Brazilian newspapers on the 2nd May 1982 bore headlines including "A state of war now exists on the Malvinas"¹¹ (Folha de S. Paulo, 1982) and "Thus, begins the Malvinas War"¹² (O Estado de São Paulo, 1982). The *Folha de S. Paulo* also reported that the Brazilian Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty) "expressed the official position of the Brazilian government, opposition to the British attack on the Malvinas Islands"¹³ (Folha de S. Paulo, 1982). This press coverage exemplifies the Brazilian position regarding the Falkland/Malvinas Islands during the conflict. However, under the censorship of Brazil's military dictatorship it should be noted that "all these sources tend to be highly politicized" (Dassin, 1984, p. 387).

In the UK, it was understood by both Thatcher's Government and the Ministry of Defence that "while public and media support could not of course win the war, they could very well help the Government lose it" (Boyce, 2005, p. 149). Although Argentina sustained the colossal loss of the *General Belgrano* towards the beginning of the conflict, it did use its Navy and especially its Air Force to defend its position. While the Argentine Navy was smaller than the British Task Force sent to defeat it, the Argentine Armed Forces were in possession of some sophisticated and modern equipment with "British destroyers, French frigates and German submarines [...] In the air there was a clear advantage in numbers if not in quality with some 120 Mirages, Skyhawks, Super-Etendards and Canberras" (Freedman, 1982, p. 203). This allowed Argentina to sink six British ships, *HMS Sheffield* (4th May), *HMS Ardent* (21st May), *HMS Antelope* (23rd May), *HMS Coventry* (25th May), the *SS Atlantic Conveyor* (25th May) and the *RFA Sir Galahad* (8th June), often using British-manufactured weapons. These victories on the Argentine side were used as propaganda by the military junta in Argentina and to maintain morale amongst its conscripted troops.

10 A similar unsubstantiated report appeared on the Mail Online website in 2012 which claims that Brazil was secretly and militarily supporting Argentina during the Falklands War. This is contrary to claims made by official Brazilian sources. (Mail Online, 2012).

11 "A guerra é total nas Malvinas".

12 "Começa a guerra das Malvinas".

13 "manifestava oficialmente a posição do governo brasileiro, contrária ao ataque inglês às ilhas Malvinas".

Here it is important to mention that British arms sales to Latin America had been extensive during the period of military rule, “largely thanks to the export of naval vessels to Argentina and Brazil. Indeed, Brazil was the third most valuable market for the UK, as measured by SIPRI [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute], between 1970 and 1979, purchasing major conventional arms worth US\$1,613 million” (Phythian, 2000, p. 134). This demonstrates a military understanding between the UK and the military governments in the Southern Cone. It must also be noted that Brazil’s military government had itself facilitated arms trade with the UK and a number of other countries by establishing the Comissão Naval Brasileira na Europa¹⁴ in 1971 and the Comissão Aeronáutica Brasileira na Europa¹⁵ in 1968, both located in London. Brazil and Argentina were under repressive military rule and yet were being sold weapons and other armaments by the UK.

This is a reminder that neither the successive Labour nor Conservative governments¹⁶ imposed sanctions on these regimes and instead continued to sell them arms. The arrival of sophisticated weaponry from abroad, it can be argued, also stimulated developments in domestic arms production in the receiving countries. For example, the defence sector in Brazil, guided by the military government, set in motion “a series of more technologically ambitious projects [which] were begun in the early 1980s: the AM-X tactical fighter [...] an advanced battle tank [...] a submarine program by the Navy (which was working toward eventual production of a nuclear submarine)” (Conca, 1992, p. 143). British arms sales to conflict zones and to oppressive regimes continue to the present day. Although British-manufactured weapons injured and even killed British troops abroad, the UK was and still is willing to maintain its international arms trade.

The irony of this attitude may not have been lost during the FMW as British soldiers fought and defended themselves against weapons and ordnance, which had been sold to the opposing side by the Government that had sent them to fight in the South Atlantic. The War ended on the 14th June 1982, after seventy-four days of fighting.

1982-1985 – Britain and the Brazilian Military Government

The FMW ended with the official surrender of the Argentine Forces on the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. The formal Instrument of Surrender was signed at 23.59 on 14th June 1982 by the Argentine Commander General de Brigada M.B. Menendez, on behalf of the Argentine Armed Forces, and, for the British, by Major General Moore. The Instrument stated that “under the terms of this surrender all Argentinian personnel in the Falklands

14 Brazilian Naval Commission in Europe.

15 Brazilian Aeronautical Commission in Europe.

16 Edward Heath (Conservative, 1970-1974), Harold Wilson (Labour, 1974-1976), James Callaghan (Labour, 1976-1979), Margaret Thatcher (Conservative, 1979-1990).

Islands [were] to muster at assembly points which [would] be nominated by General Moore and hand over their arms, ammunition, and all other weapons and warlike equipment" (FKD 429, IWM Archives). Argentina suffered the most as "the country may have had casualties numbering more than thirteen hundred, and the armed forces lost some 30 percent of its aircraft as well as "hundreds of millions of dollars" in artillery, missiles, and other expensive military weapons" (Porth, 1984, p. 54).

This section will examine the Thatcher Government's relations with the Brazilian military government, starting with the immediate aftermath of the FMW. It will also analyse the ways in which Argentina's defeat was received in both Brazil and the UK and how the direct aftermath of the War impacted Anglo-Brazilian diplomatic and defence relations. This period covers the final years of the Brazilian dictatorship, and this section will also analyse the exit strategy, known as the *abertura*,¹⁷ employed by the Brazilian military and its outgoing relations with the UK.

Upon the signing of the Instrument of Surrender, all Argentine soldiers and sailors remaining on the Islands became prisoners of war (POWs). Until they could be repatriated to Argentina, the POWs were largely held in temporary camps in and around the Islands' capital Stanley, briefly called Puerto Argentino by the Argentines. Although conditions were somewhat basic, POWs were treated in line with the conditions of the Geneva Convention of 1949. Argentine rifles were piled along roadsides and the British began to gauge the number of abandoned Argentine missiles and missile trailers, including "the Exocet missile trailer found at Port Stanley [...] [which] was possibly used in the attack on *HMS Glamorgan* on 12th June 1982" (FKD 2034, IWM Archives). The ending of the conflict allowed many Falkland Islanders, who had sought refuge in various locations on the Islands, to return to their homes. Photographs from the Falklands War albums held by the Imperial War Museum Archives further illustrate this, showing the euphoric Islanders celebrating after the signing of the Surrender (FKD 431, IWM Archives). The fallen Argentines were buried, mainly in the Argentine Military Cemetery in Darwin, East Falkland. Some of the British dead are buried at the Blue Beach Cemetery in San Carlos, East Falkland. They are also commemorated by various war memorials, such as the one at Goose Green, East Falkland.

News of the surrender, however, was badly received in Argentina. General Galtieri, the Argentine military President and the man responsible for leading Argentina to war, was removed from office by the junta shortly after the British re-capture of Stanley. His national address on Argentine television, regarding the defeat spoke of how "our nation has fought for its spiritual and material integrity"¹⁸ (TV Pública Argentina, 1982). Although

¹⁷ political opening.

¹⁸ "nuestra nación ha luchado por su integridad espiritual y material".

the humiliation of defeat led Argentina to declare its “‘de facto’ cessation of hostilities” (Boyce, 2005, p. xii) on the 12th July 1982, the “British presence in the Malvinas would continue to be a focus for attrition during the seven years following the war”¹⁹ (Dos Santos, 2016, p. 162). The defeat suffered by Argentina also “heightened the crisis of the military regime, which had loomed since the 1981 financial debacle and made public conflicts that until then had been hidden” (Romero, 2013, p. 247). Blame for defeat was therefore swiftly assigned to the military junta and this certainly contributed to the collapse of the regime in 1983.

The Argentine dictatorship's gamble to take the Islands had failed and “it is clear that one of the reasons why Argentina lost the 1982 conflict was because [it] never expected to have to fight for the islands at all” (Byrd, 1988, p. 153). This misjudgement led to the destruction of many of their prized warships during the War, such as the cruiser *General Belgrano*, as well as the calamitous loss of Argentine lives in comparison with the fatalities on the British side. In fact, “the cruiser was torpedoed with the loss of 360 men in the most costly single engagement of the war” (Freedman, 1988, p. 52).

In the UK, news of the successful campaign was greeted with an enthusiasm not seen since the end of the Second World War. The British had gone to war and returned victorious. This contributed to a sense of national pride and the feeling that the UK could fight its own battles, without allied or other assistance. The reputation of the British Armed Forces grew exponentially as the successes of the War demonstrated the value of highly trained Royal Marines and the prowess of the Task Force itself. Leading officers were rewarded with Military and Air Force Crosses and Distinguished Conduct Medals and others, such as Major General Moore, were viewed as national heroes. Although it has been argued that “in terms specifically of foreign policy, Thatcher came into office with extremely limited experience” (Dyson, 2009, p. 39), her popularity at home in the UK soared and British confidence in her leadership was restored and boosted. The UK had efficaciously moved on from its military failings during the Suez Crisis (1956). The BBC (1982) reported that “the prime minister was welcomed outside Downing Street by a jubilant crowd cheering and singing when she returned from Westminster” (BBC, 1982). Thatcher's Government was rewarded and “in the aftermath of the 1983 election it is widely believed that the ‘Falklands factor’ had been the key to the Conservative Party's re-election” (Freedman, 1988, p.100). Victory in the FMW had a dramatic impact on “domestic British politics: government popularity jumped abruptly between April-May 1982 and this effect appears to have persisted right through to the 1983 election” (Sanders et al., 1987, p. 283).

19 “presença britânica nas Malvinas permaneceria como foco de atrito nos sete anos que se seguiram à guerra”.

Just as the news of Argentina's incursion of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands was viewed by the Brazilian military as proof of "Argentine volatility" (Selcher, 1985, p. 30), news of Argentina's defeat was seen as the product of Argentine lack of "logistical support, weak inter-service coordination and shortage of supplies" (Selcher, 1985, p. 30). The Brazilian military government had watched the conflict unfold and would likely have been considering the possible outcomes of the conflict for the Argentine junta and its continued hold on power. Although the Brazilian military regime's position was secure until 1985, the year of the return to democratic rule, the ensuing unravelling of the Argentine junta in 1982 would have served as a warning, and clear example, of the need for caution in any foreign entanglements. This is supported by the argument that "countries such as Chile, Brazil and Colombia were clearly concerned by the use of force by the Argentine government in resolving its territorial dispute with Great Britain"²⁰ (Muñoz, 1982, p. 509).

The Brazilian press informed the population, on the 15th June 1982, "War ends in the Malvinas"²¹ (O Globo, 1982) and "Margaret announces the re-taking of the islands"²² (O Estado de S. Paulo, 1982). After a rather biased press stance on the FMW, understandable in the context of Brazil's position of support for the Argentine cause, which included daily news reports of the conflict, these headlines summed up and largely concluded the Brazilian press' coverage of the War. The Brazilian public was therefore aware of the conflict and its conclusion. It should be noted at this juncture that during the War, "from the British, but not the Argentine, side there were no television images. The correspondents with the task force were utterly dependent on the military for their stories and their external communications" (Freedman, 1982, p. 210). This was possible due to censorship imposed by the Brazilian military government.

It is important to emphasise that the Brazilian military government (1964-1985) and the UK had enjoyed close cooperation, which was deemed beneficial to both sides. The cementing of these relations was evident in Queen Elizabeth II's state visit to military-ruled Brazil in 1968, and the state visit of President General Geisel and his wife to the UK in 1976. During the years of the Latin American military dictatorships²³ that coincided with the Cold War, and supported the anti-Communist agenda of the US, the UK continually sold large quantities of weapons and other military equipment to these regimes. This exemplifies tacit approval and British support for those military governments.

20 "países como Chile, Brasil y Colombia estuvieron claramente preocupados por el uso de la fuerza del gobierno argentino para resolver su disputa territorial con Gran Bretaña".

21 "Termina a guerra nas Malvinas".

22 "Margaret anuncia a retomada das ilhas".

23 e.g. Paraguay (1954-1989), Uruguay (1973-1985).

The continuation of British arms sales in the 1980s is a sign of the ideological alignment of Thatcher and US President Reagan in their support for the Generals. Although the UK did temporarily cease the sale of some weaponry to Chile, under the Labour government that preceded Thatcher's, and during the time of the General Pinochet regime's most repressive period, substantial profits were being made by Britain from selling arms to Brazil. The Brazilian defence industry itself was developing rapidly and "by 1981, arms exports were over \$800 million" (Lee, 1986, p. 38). Brazilian arms exporters included "SOEs [state owned enterprises] such as Embraer²⁴ and CBC, private Brazilian firms, Engesa and Avibras, as well as MNCs [multinational companies] such as Mercedes-Benz" (De Gouvea Neto, 1991, p. 577).

Although "another major catalyst further advancing the arms industry came in 1982: the war over the Falklands/Malvinas. For South America's military establishment, this war put an end to the notion that South America was a safe continent. Foreign powers could bring war to their doorsteps" (Barros, 1984, p. 79). Set against the backdrop of the Cold War, this arguably presented an alarming prospect to the Generals in the Brazilian military regime. The US and the Soviet Union dictated the rhythm of world politics, and as an ally of the US, Brazil was taking precautions in making itself at least partially capable of its own defence and, indeed, "by the mid-1980s, after two decades of military rule, national science-and-technology activity had developed what amounted to a dual structure" (Conca, 1992, p. 146). For the UK "an aggressive American sales policy helped to create a climate of fierce competition for large orders which the British and the French felt they had to meet" (Freedman, 1978, p. 383). Due to Brazil's support for Argentina in the FMW, however, Anglo-Brazilian arms trade did initially suffer and "in 1982, British Shipbuilders lost out on an anticipated contract to build two new submarines when the Brazilians announced they would turn instead to West Germany for an order worth around £88 million" (Phythian, 2000, p. 136).

With the Islands now recaptured, the UK needed to consider what was to be done to guard against potential future invasions. This has led to the Falkland Islanders becoming some of the most expensively guarded British citizens in the world. In accordance with the Falkland Island Constitution, the UK is responsible for both its defence and foreign policy. The UK had initially failed in this duty but had successfully recovered the Islands in the War and had incurred total costs of "some £3.5 billion" (Freedman, 1988, p. 89). There was also a new democratic government in Argentina to contend with. The democratic election of President Raúl Alfonsín in 1983 signified a continued approach regarding the Falklands/Malvinas sovereignty issue. A staunch supporter of the view that the

24 Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica (Brazilian Aeronautical Company) was founded in 1969. (N.B. – It is still a major producer of Brazilian technology and weaponry).

"Malvinas" were Argentine, President Alfonsín would continue to propagate the importance of Argentina's historical claims to the Islands.

Correspondingly, this led to a reinforcement of British commitment to the Islands with heavy investments, and the building, for example, of the RAF Mount Pleasant Complex. This was opened in 1985 and "denounced by Argentina as a military base which put the peace and security of the South Atlantic and the Latin-American continent at risk"²⁵ (Dos Santos, 2016, p. 197). However, Alfonsín's Foreign Minister Dante Caputo "conveniently ignored the fact that the building of the airport was essentially a political decision taken by Thatcher in the heat of the conflict, which was aimed principally at satisfying island opinion" (Burns, 2002, p.470). Meanwhile, Alfonsín had more pressing internal issues to deal with in Argentina, such as its beleaguered economy, than to pursue strongly or directly oppose the matter of the UK's redevelopment of military capabilities on the Islands. It was at this time that Brazil partially filled the Anglo-Argentine diplomatic vacuum, with its "representation of Argentine diplomatic interests in London and its efforts to restart talks on the Falklands" (Selcher, 1985, p. 31). A recent historical footnote appeared in a BBC News article, published on the 28th December 2012, which reported that "as the war neared its climax, the Reagan administration in Washington was trying to promote the idea of a joint US-Brazilian peacekeeping force to take over the Falklands" (BBC News, 2012).

Twenty-one years of Brazilian military dictatorship would come to an end on the 15th March 1985. But to reach this point, the regime would continue to undergo its process of *abertura*. This process had begun under President Geisel in 1974 and was concerned with the slow and measured transfer of powers from the hands of the military and a relaxation of authoritarian rule. It was executed in a way that took account of "the views of the dictatorial elites concerning the future of their countr[y]" (Cohen, 1987, p. 46). This meant that democracy would come to Brazil at the pace dictated by Geisel, and later his successor President Figueiredo. Nevertheless, it is significant to note that authoritarian and repressive measures, as well as violence, were still occurring under military rule during this period.

Indeed, it can be argued that the *abertura* was implemented in such a way that "Brazilian politics still retain some important vestiges of authoritarianism. Pre-existing centres of power in society remain extraordinarily influential" (Conca, 1992, p. 141). This is evident in that, to the present day, the Brazilian Armed Forces still have control of the state's nuclear, space and cyber-security programmes. This is arguably due to the process of political opening which maintained the Brazilian military government's image

25 "denunciado pela Argentina como uma base militar que punha em risco a paz e a segurança no Atlântico Sul e no continente latino-americano".

as being less repressive than those of its neighbouring countries, such as Dirty War in Argentina. The *abertura* permitted elections for Brazilian State Governors in November 1982 and the later indirect election by Electoral College of a new civilian President in January 1985. The Brazilian military regime ended in March 1985, after twenty-one years of the Generals in power. Democracy therefore returned to Brazil. However, as argued by Power (2016, p. 24), there are still various “cause[s] for concern: the slow mass legitimization of democracy as a form of government, or the longstanding inattention to pressing issues of transitional justice”.

Concluding Remarks

This article has sought to examine the effects of the Falklands/Malvinas War on Anglo-Brazilian diplomatic and defence relations between the years 1982 and 1985. Historically, Brazil's links with the UK have been strong, and solid ties between the Brazilian Navy and the Royal Navy predate the Brazilian Republic. Although Anglo-Brazilian relations were particularly strong in the 19th century, Brazil began to shift its international focus to the US in the 20th century. During the Cold War, and with the coup d'état which brought anti-Communist military regime to power in 1964, Brazil's alignment with the US grew closer still. This proximity to the US under the military regime was arguably due to the detriment of relations with the UK, as the latter had begun to recede in importance to Brazil's world thinking and foreign policy. However, in the domain of defence relations, Anglo-Brazilian relations remained significant as Brazil purchased British-manufactured weaponry and ships. The rapprochement with Argentina nevertheless led to Brazil re-affirming its commitment to Argentina's sovereignty claim to the Falkland/Malvinas Islands and its continued interests and alignment with its fellow countries in Latin America.

Consideration of the position held by Brazil during the FMW has involved outlining the attitudes and actions of the British democratic, and Argentine and Brazilian military, governments regarding the conflict. These have been important starting points in the context for analysis of Anglo-Brazilian diplomatic and defence relations during the period of 1982–1985. The Argentine military government had hoped to regain public and popular support by invading the Islands and reclaiming the territory after, what it viewed as, one hundred and fifty years of British occupation. The UK government, however, reacted in ways that were unexpected by the Argentine junta, committing a large Task Force of soldiers and sailors to retake South Georgia and the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. Thatcher's actions allowed the Islanders to regain their affiliation with the UK and were endorsed by British public sentiment that the War was justified. The miscalculation by the junta also led to heavy losses on the Argentine side; its mostly conscripted soldiers were ill-prepared to deal with the better trained and professional British Armed Forces.

The Brazilian military regime was placed in a challenging situation where it had to gauge whether to give priority to its historically positive relations with the UK or its more recent but valuable rapprochement with Argentina. Brazil's reaction was to maintain a militarily neutral position during the War, although this has been contested in some recent news articles and adopt a political and diplomatic position favourable to Argentina. Brazil condemned the UK after the UN Security Council's reaction on 3rd April 1982, in the form of the British tabled UN Resolution 502, which demanded an end to the conflict and a withdrawal of Argentine forces. Their position against this Resolution is further proof of what Brazil deemed as British colonialist attitudes in the South Atlantic region. The temporary impounding and later release of a British Vulcan bomber, nevertheless, exemplifies this predicament to stay on good terms with both Argentina and the UK.

The Argentine defeat in the FMW contributed to the junta's collapse and led the military to leave power in disgrace. This would not have gone unnoticed by the military rulers in Brasilia and would have served to caution against any military campaigns against a militarily superior enemy. It was, furthermore, a lesson that taught that military regimes could be toppled. Indeed, "the Malvinas conflict demonstrated that the existence of democracy is really a very important aspect of Southern Cone countries' national security"²⁶ (Muñoz, 1982, p. 511). The Brazilian military government, however, was to stay in power until March 1985, managing and controlling its exit via its process of *abertura*. This political opening has arguably contributed to the continued and current influence of the Brazilian Armed Forces in Brazil and their dominance in the development of new nuclear, space and cyber technology. For the UK, triumph in the FMW was a means to restore national pride and maintain that it was no longer a nation in decline. The success of Thatcher's decisions was a key factor in the Conservatives' re-election in 1983.

The recent war in the South Atlantic stimulated a further increase in the Brazilian arms and defence industry, which had already grown substantially under the military regime. The arms trade was an important feature of Brazil's relations with the UK, and Brazil arguably began to challenge the UK's position as a supplier of aircraft, when Embraer developed the Tucano trainer. This was a sign of advances in Brazil's ability to produce its own arms and develop its own military technology and capabilities. The FMW also led the UK to lose business in its immediate aftermath to West Germany, in the building of two new submarines.

As this article has examined, the FMW led Brazil to be pulled in two directions, one in its support for Argentina, and another with its historical alignment and interests in common with the UK. Brazil's hosting of an Argentine delegation at its Embassy in London

26 "el conflicto de las Malvinas demostró que la existencia de la democracia es en realidad un componente muy importante de la seguridad nacional de los países del Cono Sur".

during the seven years of Anglo-Argentine diplomatic impasse is evidence of Brazil's wish to act as an intermediary and maintain good relations with both its neighbour Argentina and the UK. However, Brazil could have harboured other or additional preferences. Following the FMW, would Brazil really have wanted a victorious and recently belligerent Argentina on its border? As one commentator has pointed out, "a British defeat would almost certainly have inflated the Argentine military's self-image to the point of tempting it to achieve regional superiority" (Burns, 1988, p. 71). It is quite possible to consider that the answer is in the negative and that Brazil was quietly relieved to see a British victory. At the very least, it would mean business as usual in its relations with the UK and, perhaps more importantly, with Britain's closest ally, the United States.

Disclosure statement

The author declares that there is no potential conflict of interest related to the article.

Financing

The author does not declare a source of financing for the completion of this article.

Author

Maísa Edwards. Dr Maísa Edwards holds a Joint International Relations PhD from King's College London (KCL) and the University of São Paulo. She has an MSc Brazil in Global Perspective from KCL and a BA(Hons) French and Spanish from University College London. Her research focuses on Brazilian diplomatic and defence relations, zones of peace, maritime security and the South Atlantic region.

<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3286-149X> - Contact: maisa.edwards@kcl.ac.uk

References

- Arquilla, J., & Moyano Rasmussen, M. (2001). The origins of the South Atlantic War. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 33(4), 739-775. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/i370240>
- Barros, A. (1984). Chapter 5: Brazil. In J. Katz (Ed.), *Arms production in developing countries* (pp. 73-87). Lexington Books.
- BBC News. (2012). Falklands telegrams reveal UK response to invasion. *BBC News*. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-20817088>
- BBC on this day | 14 | 1982: Ceasefire agreed in Falklands. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/14/newsid_2561000/2561187.stm
- Boyce, D. (2005). *The Falklands War* (1st ed.). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Burns, J. (1988). 'A small colonial war': The Falklands/Malvinas dispute. In J. Ferguson & J. Pearce (Eds.), *The Thatcher years: Britain and Latin America* (pp. 67-78). Latin America Bureau (Research and Action) Ltd.
- Burns, J. (2002). *The land that lost its heroes: How Argentina lost the Falklands War*. Bloomsbury.
- Byrd, P. (1988). Introduction. In P. Byrd (Ed.), *British foreign policy under Thatcher*. University of Warwick; St Martin's Press.

- Central Intelligence Agency. (1985). *Brazil: Prospects for the regime* (pp. 359-384). <https://tinyurl.com/yc4bfshb>
- Cohen, Y. (1987). Democracy from above: The political origins of military dictatorship in Brazil. *World Politics*, 40(1), 30-54. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010193>
- Conca, K. (1992). Technology, the military, and democracy in Brazil. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 34(1), 141-177. <https://doi.org/10.2307/166152>
- Craddock, P. (1997). *In pursuit of British interests: Reflections on foreign policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major*. Cambridge University Press.
- Dassin, J. (1984). The Brazilian press and the politics of abertura. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 26(3), 385-414. <https://doi.org/10.2307/165675>
- De Gouvea Neto, R. (1991). The role of transnational companies in the Brazilian defence tripod. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 23(3), 573-597. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X00015856>
- Dos Santos, E. (2016). *Entre o Beagle e as Malvinas: Conflito e diplomacia na América do Sul*. FUNAG.
- Duarte, É. E., & Machado, L. R. (2021). Between coercive diplomacy and Malvinas fortress: Argentina's maritime operations in the Falklands/Malvinas War. In É. E. Duarte (Ed.), *The Falklands/Malvinas War in the South Atlantic* (pp. 51-84). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Dyson, S. (2009). Cognitive style and foreign policy: Margaret Thatcher's black-and-white thinking. *International Political Science Review*, 30(1), 33-48. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512108097055>
- Edição do Dia. (1982, January 15). *Acervo O Globo*. <https://tinyurl.com/2876yugb>
- Edição do Dia. (1982, June 15). *Acervo O Globo*. <https://tinyurl.com/2648ultd>
- Falklands War Photographic Dossiers (FKD Collections). (1982). *Imperial War Museum Archives*.
- Fausto, B. (1999). *A concise history of Brazil* (1st ed.). Cambridge University Press.
- Folha de S. Paulo. (1982, April 30). <http://acervo.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/1982/04/30/2/>
- Folha de S. Paulo. (1982, January 15). <http://acervo.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/1985/01/15/2/>
- Folha de S. Paulo. (1982, June 4). <http://acervo.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/1982/06/04/2/>
- Folha de S. Paulo. (1982, May 2). <http://acervo.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/1982/05/02/2/>
- Folha de S. Paulo. (1982, November 23). <http://acervo.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/1990/11/23/2/>
- Freedman, L. (1978). British foreign policy to 1985 IV: Britain and the arms trade. *International Affairs*, 54(3), 377-392. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2616147>
- Freedman, L. (1982). The War of the Falkland Islands, 1982. *Foreign Affairs*, 61(1), 196-210. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/i20041345>
- Freedman, L. (1988). *Britain and the Falklands War* (1st ed.). Basil Blackwell.
- Hurrell, A. J. (1983). The politics of South Atlantic security: A survey of proposals for a South Atlantic Treaty Organization. *International Affairs*, 59(2), 179-193. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2619934>
- Lee, B. (1986). Brazil: Supplying the world's arms. *Harvard International Review*, 8(6), 38-40.
- Little, W. (1988). Chapter 7: Anglo-Argentine relations and the management of the Falklands question. In P. Byrd (Ed.), *British foreign policy under Thatcher*. University of Warwick; St Martin's Press.
- Mail Online. (2012). Revealed: How Brazil secretly supplied 'bombs, planes and ammunition' to Argentina during Falklands War. <https://tinyurl.com/28kkuc3z>
- Marshall, O. (2002). *Brazil in British and Irish archives* (1st ed.). Centre for Brazilian Studies, University of Oxford.
- McCourt, D. M. (2014). *Britain and world power since 1945: Constructing a nation's role in international politics*. University of Michigan Press.
- Mullins, M. (2006). *In the shadow of the generals: Foreign policy making in Argentina, Brazil and Chile*. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.

- Muñoz, H. (1982). Efectos y lecciones del conflicto de las Malvinas. *Estudios Internacionales*, 15(60), 499-512. <https://doi.org/10.5354/0719-3769.1982.15961>
- O Estado de S. Paulo - Acervo Estadão. (1982, June 15). <https://tinyurl.com/2xnat7ph>
- O Estado de S. Paulo - Acervo Estadão. (1982, May 2). <https://tinyurl.com/225noxh8>
- Pythian, M. (2000). *The politics of British arms sales since 1964* (1st ed.). Manchester University Press.
- Porth, J. (1984). Chapter 4: Argentina. In J. Katz (Ed.), *Arms production in developing countries* (pp. 53-72). Lexington Books.
- Power, T. J. (2016). The Brazilian military regime of 1964-1985: Legacies for contemporary democracy / O regime militar brasileiro de 1964-1985: Legados para a democracia contemporânea. *Iberoamericana*, 16(62), 13-26. Iberoamericana Editorial Vervuert.
- Raf.mod.uk. (2007). Falklands—Operation Black Buck.
- Romero, L. (2013). *A history of Argentina in the twentieth century* (1st ed.). Penn State University Press.
- Sanders, D., Ward, H., Marsh, D., & Fletcher, T. (1987). Government popularity and the Falklands War: A reassessment. *British Journal of Political Science*, 17(3), 281-313. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/193822>
- Seabra de Cruz Junior, A., Cavalcante, A., & Pedone, L. (1993). Brazil's foreign policy under Collor. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 35(1), 119-144. <https://doi.org/10.2307/166104>
- Selcher, W. (1985). Brazilian-Argentine relations in the 1980s: From wary rivalry to friendly competition. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 27(2), 25-53. <https://doi.org/10.2307/165717>
- Sunday Express. (2015). Margaret Thatcher's fury at Brazil for refusing to hand back our bombers during Falklands. <https://tinyurl.com/2apckaw2>
- TV Pública Argentina. (1982). Archivo histórico: Galtieri - Cadena Nacional - Rendición Malvinas - 15-06-1982. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FlpHE7rhTm4>
- UN Security Council. (1982). Resolution 502. <https://tinyurl.com/3rvj2sdw>
- Welch, D. (1997). Remember the Falklands? Missed lessons of a misunderstood war. *International Journal*, 483-507.